

TCM 75-49

Trends in Communist Media

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
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Trends in Communist Media

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POLISH PARTY CONGRESS

The 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, which opened in Warsaw on 8 December, provided the setting for CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev's first major speech on foreign policy issues since his 31 July address to the CSCE meeting in Helsinki. Like his Helsinki address and most of his other speeches this year, his Warsaw speech was a short one, running only 29 minutes. It covered three main topics--Polish party achievements, relations among the socialist states, and East-West relations generally.

Aside from an uncharacteristically critical attitude toward the West, Brezhnev struck predictable notes on all subjects. He did balance his criticism of the West with a renewed assurance of the Soviet Union's commitment to detente. Notably, he failed to mention either the projected European communist parties conference or the Chinese leadership--both of which were mentioned by Gierk. In his last appearance at an East European party congress, in Budapest in March 1975, Brezhnev mentioned the European CP conference and criticized the Chinese obliquely.

Overall, Brezhnev's focus on defensive themes--criticism of the West and stress on socialist unity--seems to reflect a stand-pat attitude on East-West relations combined with an effort to reemphasize Moscow's socialist credentials.

BREZHNEV AFFIRMS CSCE COMMITMENT, ATTACKS THE WEST

Brezhnev provided new momentum to Moscow's developing campaign of criticism of the West by strongly attacking what he described as a "campaign of slander" against the socialist countries that has allegedly emerged in the West in the wake of Helsinki. Denouncing this campaign as directly counter to the "spirit" of the CSCE decisions, he said that the creation of a climate of "mutual trust" and "an appropriate moral and political atmosphere" were preconditions for further development of East-West relations. Brezhnev had some other harsh words for the West, as he warned of "bourgeois" attempts to weaken the unity of the socialist bloc through "ideological penetration" and the use of "economic levers" and maintained that people of "all continents" could expect help from the Soviet Union in "rebuffing Western aggression." He did not specifically discuss Soviet-U.S. relations.

Brezhnev's remarks on CSCE are the most extensive and detailed by any Soviet leader since the conclusion of the CSCE summit. They serve to emphasize Moscow's annoyance over Western attempts to

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portray a discrepancy between commitments at Helsinki and Soviet practice since the summit. Brezhnev criticized those who failed to see the significance of the CSCE agreement "as a whole" and who tore the document "into little bits" for "tactical convenience." The "needling" and "pinpricks" of "certain influential circles" in the West, he charged, are aimed at "arousing retaliatory reaction and poisoning the atmosphere." All these activities, he said, are "far from being in accord" with the Helsinki spirit and impede the strengthening of mutual trust and constructive cooperation.

Brezhnev seemed to go out of his way to suggest a link between the West's future behavior on the CSCE agreements and the Soviet Union's future attitude toward other East-West issues. In an unusual reference to the CSCE followup meeting scheduled to be held in Belgrade in 1977--Soviet leaders and the media have rarely mentioned the 1977 meeting in post-CSCE comment--Brezhnev asserted that there "could" be "concrete positive results" if the Helsinki agreements are implemented "step-by-step" and if there is a "strengthening of mutual trust." Without this, he said, there "can be no talk of genuine blossoming of international cooperation."

Brezhnev's lengthy remarks on CSCE did serve to underscore Moscow's belief in the continued efficacy of the Helsinki framework for structuring European relations despite the adverse developments about which he complained. Brezhnev further underlined the continuity of Soviet foreign policy in observing that despite the "complex and contradictory nature" of the current international situation, detente continues to be its dominant feature, and in calling for further "concrete actions" to strengthen it. He mentioned specifically the need for progress in MBFR and for joint action in areas such as environmental protection and transportation.

His emphasis on threats to the unity of the socialist bloc elsewhere in the speech and his failure to touch upon specific international issues other than CSCE seemed to suggest, however, that Moscow is at the moment looking inward to relations with its socialist allies and seeking to reaffirm its socialist credentials.

BREZHNEV PRAISES GIEREK, STRESSES BLOC HARMONY

Brezhnev paid warm tribute to the Polish party's efforts, under First Secretary Edward Gierek's leadership, to overcome its domestic economic difficulties. The Soviet leader's praise for Gierek went beyond the endorsements of the Polish leader voiced at the 1971 PZPR congress or on the 30th anniversary celebration of communist Poland in July 1974, where he had praised Gierek as a national leader only. Now, in his 9 December speech, Brezhnev hailed Gierek as "an outstanding figure of People's Poland, the socialist community, and the

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international communist movement." The tribute was more in line with those given by Brezhnev to other East European party leaders in recent years, which have usually cited the leaders' role in the world communist movement.

Implicitly taking note of the crisis experienced by Poland five years ago, Brezhnev praised "the atmosphere which exists in the country now." In tune with Gierek's own sober assessment of Poland's economic situation, Brezhnev noted in restrained terms that the Polish communists "have every reason to be satisfied with the results of their work" in recent years and voiced "no doubt" that the PZPR would "do everything possible" to carry out the "complex tasks, tasks of great magnitude" in the future.

Presumably with Romanian complaints about Soviet domination chiefly in mind, Brezhnev praised the socialist community as "a voluntary alliance of equal, sovereign and independent states." He went on to take the West to task for alleged efforts to weaken the unity of the socialist community and undermine socialism "in various socialist countries" through ideological subversion "and the use of economic levers." The reference to economic levers could be a possible warning about dangers inherent in trade with the West by such countries as Romania, Hungary, and Poland itself.

Brezhnev's reference in this connection to "traitors to the socialist cause" who "denigrate our community" and distort the socialist countries' mutual relations could be an allusion to deposed Czechoslovak leader Dubcek and his Prague Spring followers, whose denunciations of the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention and the present Husak regime have been aired in Western media during the past year. Husak, shortly after his return from a Moscow visit in March of this year, had explicitly branded the activities of these dissidents as "treason" in a major Prague speech. Brezhnev had used much the same formula in referring to the Czech dissidents in his welcoming speech for Husak during the latter's visit to Moscow in late November. He described them as "renegades who have given up the cause of socialism." Gierek, also, in his earlier report to the congress had referred to "class enemies both in our country and, above all, among those striving to influence us from abroad" who attack the unity of the socialist countries "and in particular our alliance with the Soviet Union."

GIEREK GIVES CANDID REVIEW OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In his opening report to the congress on the 8th, Polish party leader Gierek devoted most of his attention to domestic matters, particularly the state of the Polish economy. Attributing some of the blame for the shortages of various consumer goods, including

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food, to an imbalance between prices and wages, Gierek warned of price increases in store. He also stressed the need for greater labor productivity, taking a notably tougher stand on various manifestations of worker indiscipline than he had in pre-congress speeches.

On international affairs, Gierek paid tribute to the "peace program" of the 24th CPSU congress, detente, and the CSCE. He also denounced the "disruptive chauvinistic policy of the Maoist Chinese leadership," saying that it "does not serve the cause of peace and progress," and declaring that "we reject this policy decisively."

The Polish leader voiced optimism regarding the planned European communist parties conference, insisting that there were "good conditions for insuring the success" of the conference. Despite the opposition to a world communist party conference by such independent parties as those of Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Spain--all represented at the Polish congress--Gierek went on to call for "a new world conference of our movement." He followed up this appeal with a restrained endorsement of joint action between nonruling communist parties and other "democratic" parties, remarking that "we share the attitude of other fraternal parties as regards cooperation with socialists, social democrats, and other democratic forces." Gierek's statement on this issue was somewhat more restrained than that contained in the PZPR congress directives, which declared that our party "supports" the development of contacts between communist parties, socialist and social-democratic parties, and other "democratic" forces. Gierek's remarks on the issue were addressed to a congress audience which included PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM Chief Editor Zarodov, whose 6 August PRAVDA article sparked public debate over the issue in the communist world.

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U. S. - V I E T N A M

HANOI NONCOMMITTAL ON FORD REMARKS ON INDOCHINA RELATIONS

Hanoi has been notably cautious and circumspect in its initial media reaction to President Ford's remarks on Indochina in his 7 December Honolulu speech proclaiming the Pacific Doctrine. Most of his statements regarding the future of U.S. relations with Indochina were reported promptly and accurately by Hanoi radio on the 8th, but the radio did not offer any judgment on the speech. Moreover, an unsigned commentary in the 10 December issue of the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, as broadcast by the radio, failed even to mention the President's remarks on Indochina, although it criticized the Pacific Doctrine enunciated in the Honolulu address. Similar Hanoi reluctance to address publicly the question of relations with the United States was reflected last month, when monitored Vietnamese media did not report Secretary Kissinger's 24 November speech in which he affirmed that Washington envisaged the eventual normalization of relations with Indochinese countries.*

Presenting a straightforward account of the President's remarks, the 8 December Hanoi broadcast noted that he had indicated that U.S. policies toward Indochina would be predicated on the conduct of the new regimes there toward the United States. The radio also cited his assertion that the return of the remains of Americans killed in action would be considered a gesture of goodwill for which the United States would be willing to reciprocate. Monitored Hanoi media have not, however, reported the 6 December announcement by the DRV ambassador in Paris--following talks with members of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons--that the bodies of three U.S. pilots were being returned.

Hanoi's report on the President's speech did not take note of his statement that Washington would "look to the future rather than the past" if the countries of Indochina exhibited restraint toward their neighbors and a constructive approach to international problems. By contrast, earlier Hanoi had reacted to a similar statement in Secretary Kissinger's 18 June speech before the Japan Society in New York by ignoring his gesture toward future relations while attacking his remarks on Indochinese attitudes toward international agreements and neighboring countries.**

* Hanoi's failure to comment on Kissinger's 24 November address is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 December 1975, pages 19-20.

** A 21 June NHAN DAN commentary on Secretary Kissinger's 18 June speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 25 June 1975, pages 6-7.

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While the radio report did not directly comment on the President's remarks, it did note that he "said nothing" about the U.S. "pledge" to contribute to the compensation for war damage in Vietnam, as provided under the Paris agreement. Last June the NHAN DAN commentary on Secretary Kissinger's 18 June speech had spelled out the standard Vietnamese position that implementation of Article 21 of the Paris Agreement on U.S. assistance to postwar reconstruction was a necessary basis for the normalization of U.S.-DRV relations. The condition that the United States comply with Article 21 in order to improve relations was most recently repeated by PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at a 21 November press conference in Saigon.

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PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

PEKING REPORTS VISIT CONCLUSION, SILENT ON "PACIFIC DOCTRINE"

Peking media treatment of concluding activities during President Ford's 1-5 December visit continued to follow the protocol pattern of similar ceremonies during former President Nixon's 1972 China trip.* However, the absence of a joint communique marking this visit, and the lack of a Presidential tour of Chinese provincial cities resulted in relatively less extensive Chinese coverage than in 1972.

As Chou En-lai had done during a similar banquet hosted by Nixon in 1972, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping recapitulated highlights of the visit in his "toast" at the President's reciprocal banquet on 4 December. Teng characterized the Sino-U.S. talks as "beneficial," while noting continuing "differences of principle" in Sino-U.S. relations. As in his remarks at the 1 December welcoming banquet, Teng stressed common Sino-U.S. tasks in the present international situation, and he noted both sides' reaffirmation that the 1972 Shanghai communique constitutes the basis of Sino-U.S. understanding. As in 1972, the President was seen off from Peking airport by a Chinese delegation including three Politburo members; NCNA noted, as it had in reporting President Ford's arrival, that a formal "ceremony" marked the occasion--a slight advance over 1972, when no such ceremony was reported.

Terse NCNA dispatches on 6 and 7 December reported without comment on President Ford's trips to Indonesia and the Philippines and on discussions with top leaders there. Peking has not yet reported the President's stay in Hawaii and his address there on his "Pacific doctrine," nor his 8 December return to Washington.

NCNA reported on the 6th that U.S. Liaison Office Chief Bush was received that day, prior to his departure for home, by Teng Hsiao-ping--a protocol formality usually handled by lower-ranking Chinese leaders. The agency briefly noted Bush's departure on the 7th.

* Peking's earlier coverage of President Ford's trip is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 December 1975, pages 1-3.

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MOSCOW SEES SINO-U.S. DISAGREEMENT ON DETENTE, ACCORD ON ASIA

Soviet media assessments of President Ford's visit to Peking stressed indications of U.S. resolve in the face of Chinese warnings regarding Soviet motives in pursuing a policy of detente. Soviet commentators cited Western reports to imply that disagreement over policy toward the USSR was an important factor impeding further improvement in relations. The Soviet accounts did, however, take note of alleged Chinese approval of a continued American presence in Asia.

Echoing reports filed by TASS during the visit, an observer on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable on foreign affairs on 7 December cited a White House spokesman's assertions that Peking's attacks on detente "did not manage to alter the American position." The radio observer went on to attribute the lack of a communique at the end of the talks to the fact that the two sides "were so far apart in their assessment of the main question--international detente," a point made also by PRAVDA. Another observer on the roundtable program noted that assessments of the visit in the U.S. and West European press concluded that "the uncertainty in Sino-American relations remains." A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Asia on the 2d described the "current coolness" in Sino-U.S. relations.

The TASS report of President Ford's 7 December speech in Hawaii setting forth a "Pacific Doctrine" did, however, acknowledge Sino-U.S. agreement on some Asian problems. The report--published on 9 December in some Moscow papers--quoted Ford's statement that there are "very important spheres of common concern and agreement" between the two countries and added "as is evident from the President's statements, one of these points of agreement is Southeast Asia." TASS noted that during the Peking talks the Chinese had made clear that they want the United States "to continue its military presence and activate its role in South and Southeast Asia."

TASS accounts of the President's stopovers in Indonesia and the Philippines after leaving Peking reported that the President was told in Peking that the Chinese would "take no action to undermine the U.S. position" in the Philippines, Japan or elsewhere in Asia. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary broadcast to Asia on the 3d claimed that "American top level officials" are not unsympathetic regarding a joint China-Japan-United States alliance for the "dominance of Asia."

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EAST EUROPEANS STRESS PRESIDENT'S UNSHAKEN SUPPORT OF DETENTE

Moscow's East European allies emulated Soviet media treatment of the visit in highlighting the President's reaffirmation of his support for detente in the face of Peking's anti-Soviet attacks. A Budapest television commentary on the 2d was typical of other comment by Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in saying that the President had "adhered to the sober rules of the game of peaceful coexistence" despite Peking's efforts to "incite" the United States against the Soviet Union. Even stronger satisfaction was expressed by the Polish daily DZIENNIK LUDOWY which, according to PAP on the 6th, contended that the visit "confirmed" that the United States attaches the highest priority to its relations with Moscow. However, the Moscow-allied countries also expressed caution about the visit. For example, the 6 December Prague daily PRACE, while noting U.S. resistance to Peking's anti-Soviet overtures, warned that it would be "wrong to view this idealistically," since the United States had also sought to avoid antagonizing Peking by "satisfying" it in other areas, particularly economic. Similarly, scattered East European commentaries alleged that the two countries shared common ground in support of U.S. efforts to assert an "imperialist" presence in the Far East.

Bucharest treated the visit in noncommittal fashion, limiting its coverage to brief, factual reports. This contrasted with the highly favorable comment which welcomed President Nixon's 1972 visit. Bucharest's gingerly treatment of the Ford visit probably reflects its unwillingness to become embroiled in the Sino-Soviet dispute, a stance demonstrated by its policy of ignoring attacks on Peking by the other Warsaw Pact members. Yugoslav comment accords with Belgrade's traditional position of neutrality regarding tensions among the big powers. Thus, in noting the U.S.-Chinese differences over detente, Belgrade studiously avoided discussing the merits of their respective positions. Belgrade comment generally tended to disparage the significance of the U.S.-Chinese talks by portraying them as yielding nothing more than a clarification of the differing stands of the two sides. TANJUG's Washington correspondent on the 9th, however, commented that the visit exceeded the "expectations" of U.S. observers and professed to see "at least a hint" of "more coordinated actions" of the two countries in dealing with international problems. At the same time, the correspondent echoed earlier Belgrade comment in asserting that the U.S. had no intention of subordinating its relations with Moscow for the sake of greater rapprochement with Peking.

Peking's ally Albania took the same approach as during the 1972 Nixon visit in limiting its coverage to terse reports.

EAST TIMOR

PRC, DRV, AND CUBA SCORE INDONESIAN INVASION OF FORMER COLONY

Peking, Hanoi, and Havana have publicly condemned Indonesia for its 7 December invasion of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The Chinese reaction represents a major departure from Peking's circumspect treatment of the Jakarta government in recent years, when it has been attempting to improve relations with its noncommunist Southeast Asian neighbors. Both Hanoi and Havana, but not Peking, have linked the Indonesian action with President Ford's visit to Jakarta, with DRV media portraying it as part of a larger U.S. strategy for Southeast Asia. Moscow media are not known to have commented on their own authority on the events in East Timor, although TASS has carried reports on the situation and noted the Portuguese Government's appeal for convocation of the UN Security Council to end Indonesia's "armed aggression."

PEKING The first authoritative Chinese comment on the Indonesian military action in East Timor came in a 9 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which criticized the Indonesian move and, for the first time, extended explicit support to the East Timor "people's" struggle. Low-level PRC criticism of Indonesian military intervention was voiced before the Commentator article, however, in a brief NCNA report on 5 December remarks by the Chinese representative in the United Nations and in a 7 December NCNA report on military developments in East Timor.

The commentator article refrained from attacking Indonesian leaders by name, but it bluntly labeled Jakarta's military action an "armed invasion" designed to "annex" East Timor. Rebuffing Indonesian "pretexts" for sending troops into the territory, it charged that the action not only threatened East Timor's security but also undermined the "peace and stability of the area." While criticizing Indonesia for "turning a deaf ear" to repeated appeals for friendship from the newly established Democratic Republic of East Timor, the article held out "hope" that Indonesia and East Timor might yet peacefully solve their problems, provided Jakarta withdraws its forces.

The Commentator article portrayed the founding of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November by the Revolutionary Front for Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) as a reflection of the "East Timor people's aspiration for independence." It did not offer explicit Chinese support for the new government, however, instead noting the resolve of the "people of East Timor" to "carry

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out armed resistance" in defense of independence and pledging that "the Chinese people firmly support the East Timor people's struggle for national liberation and independence."

Peking media since mid-October had carried occasional NCNA dispatches favorably noting FRETILIN opposition to Indonesia and rival East Timor political groups, but had not explicitly stated a Chinese position.*

The current Chinese denunciation of Indonesia's actions contrasts sharply with the Peking media's careful treatment of Jakarta in recent years. In concert with Peking's efforts to improve relations with noncommunist neighbors, Chinese media since 1970 have muffled criticism of the Indonesian regime and sharply reduced attention to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Adverse Chinese reporting on Indonesian affairs in the past three years has been limited to NCNA reports in August 1973 on anti-Chinese riots and in January 1974 on student demonstrations. During this same period, Peking has acknowledged the presence in China of PKI leader Jusuf Adjitorop only in noting his appearance at annual May Day and Chinese National Day celebrations. This pattern was recently broken when NCNA reported that Adjitorop had attended a 29 November Albanian National Day reception in Peking.**

HANOI Vietnamese media have condemned the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, voiced support for FRETILIN, and warned that the United States was the mastermind behind Jakarta's actions. The first direct Vietnamese criticism of Jakarta in available media was in a 9 December NHAN DAN article which accused "the reactionary forces in power in Jakarta" of attempting to "annex" East Timor, "strongly condemned" Indonesian "aggression," and "demanded" the immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor. Indonesia's military involvement in the East Timor conflict had been noted in Hanoi media since a 31 October NHAN DAN article on the fighting, but comment had stopped short of explicitly condemning Jakarta's actions. The 9 December NHAN DAN article also explicitly criticized East Timor political groups attacking FRETILIN, charging that they were "fostered by the Indonesian

* For a discussion of Peking's earlier treatment of the East Timor question, see the TRENDS of 3 December 1975, page 25.

** For background on previous Peking media treatment of Indonesia, see the 22 August 1975 FBIS SPECIAL REPORT ON COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA No. 310, "Peking's 'Dual-Track' Policy in Southeast Asia Produces Gains," pages 8-9.

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authorities." "Warm support" of the Vietnamese "people" for FRETILIN had been voiced earlier in a 3 December NHAN DAN article, but was not repeated in subsequent Hanoi comment.

Hanoi's contention that Indonesia's actions in East Timor were encouraged by the United States was underlined in the 9 December NHAN DAN article and an article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the following day. NHAN DAN charged that the timing of the invasion demonstrated that Washington had "given the green light" for it--citing the fact that the military move came on the heels of President Ford's visit to Jakarta and reports that Secretary Kissinger had stated that the United States would not recognize the Democratic People's Republic of East Timor. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article made a similar linkage and charged that Indonesia plays "an important role" in U.S. efforts to "patch its military line of defense in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific." The paper rejected as a deception President Ford's reported remark that he was concerned with Indonesia's use of force and hoped for a peaceful settlement.

Although Hanoi comment in the wake of the communist takeover of South Vietnam last spring had called attention to Vietnam's desire to strengthen relations with Southeast Asian states and had suggested that conditions were favorable for such a move, the media had also continued to note critically evidence of Indonesia's continuing ties with the United States. Hanoi commentaries on Southeast Asia also pointedly recalled Indonesia's anticommunist measures following the 1965 coup attempt, asserting that "nobody can forget" the "massacre of hundreds of thousands of communists" and other progressives in "one of the Southeast Asian countries."*

HAVANA A Radio Havana report on 9 December condemned Jakarta's invasion of East Timor as "another product of the imperialist conspiracies against popular governments" and further proof that "reactionary intervention continues to be a general phenomenon for Third World countries." Like Hanoi, Havana linked the United States to the invasion, quoting the East Timor Foreign Ministry as having "denounced the collusion of the U.S. Government in this interventionist action by Indonesia" and pointing to the "very significant fact" that the invasion came on the heels of the Indonesia visit by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger.

Although Cuban media in the past gave scant attention to Timor, Radio Havana's current report is consistent with the Castro regime's tendency to see a U.S. hand in internal disturbances in Third World

* Hanoi's postwar policy toward Southeast Asia is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 9-12.

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countries. Thus, for example, the wording of the 9 December report was similar to that used in a 16 August radio commentary on the Bangladesh coup which accused "the international counterrevolution headed by U.S. imperialism" of bringing about "the overthrow of another popular, anti-imperialist government." The current report also is in line with Havana's traditional support to new Third World countries and opposition to annexation of newly independent territories by larger neighbors, as indicated by the strong backing Cuba has recently given Belize.

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CHINA

PEKING SIGNALS NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST EDUCATION "REVISIONISTS"

China's ongoing controversy over educational policy between advocates of radical, revolutionary education and the moderate "revisionists" who place more stress on traditional academic values appears to have taken another turn, in a new campaign pressing the revolutionary line. The new drive was signaled by an unusually critical article in the December issue of RED FLAG attacking "bad elements in educational circles," who Peking evidently sees as seeking to restore "revisionist" practices in China's schools. This RED FLAG article, "Orientation of Educational Revolution Should Not Be Tampered With," was written by the mass criticism groups of Peking University and Tsinghua University, China's two most prestigious universities. It was broadcast by Peking radio on 3 December and printed in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 4th.

A Peking broadcast on 29 November indicated that the same issue of RED FLAG contains other articles on the politics of educational reform--not yet available in translation--that apparently will also be used to criticize cadres who have charged that the educational system that has developed since China's cultural revolution is inadequate to meet China's needs. The new campaign also is reflected in another signed article in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 9 December and initial provincial radio reports defending the educational reforms of the cultural revolution and warning of the need for vigilance against attempts to "sabotage" the educational reform of that period.

The new campaign comes against the background of recent calls in the Chinese provincial media for improving the quality of education, particularly for students engaged in scientific study. The moderate line on educational reform now under fire appears to be linked to the recently concluded national conference on learning from Tachai in agriculture. Ever since that conference ended in Peking in October, the Chinese media have been dominated by exhortations to heed the Tachai call to speed the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology. These ambitious modernization goals, which will require the full support of larger numbers of skilled workers, may have caused overzealous education officials to go too far in improving the quality of education at the expense of political study--an imbalance the new campaign appears to be designed to correct.

There is evidence that in the new campaign Peking hopes to straighten out the line on educational reform without recourse to disruptive mass actions of the type used in the cultural revolution, in the 9 December PEOPLE'S DAILY article seconding RED FLAG. This article, published on the paper's front page, was signed by Liang Hsiao, an authoritative

Chinese commentator. Liang suggested that "these important problems" over the educational line should be solved under the leadership of the party by "setting forth facts and reasoning things out," an ostensibly moderate approach. Liang denounced the "absurd argument on the educational front . . . that there has been no construction following destruction" and that there was "a lack of enthusiasm for educational knowledge." He charged that these mistaken views reflected a desire by some cadres to restore the educational system which existed prior to the cultural revolution.

RED FLAG ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM The RED FLAG article focused on countering the "ridiculous charge within educational circles" that "since the great proletarian cultural revolution, everything concerning the educational revolution is a flop" and that the situation must be "reversed." Recalling the important role that the issue of educational reform played in China's political turmoil of the late 1960's, the article pointed out that the cultural revolution "started on the cultural and educational front" and that Chairman Mao Tse-tung "personally dispatched worker and PLA propaganda teams to Tsinghua and Peking University and grasped the educational revolution himself." Indicating that yet another period of ideological struggle on the sensitive question of educational reform is in the offing, the article stressed that educational reform is part of the class struggle in society and it warned that "when the question of the correct versus the erroneous line is clarified, we will truly be able to promote stability and unity."

Peking's attack on unnamed educational leaders for attempting to shift educational policy away from the ideologically motivated educational reforms announced during the cultural revolution comes amid a widespread campaign to upgrade the quality of education in order to train the vast numbers of highly skilled workers required to reach China's goal, set forth at the National People's Congress last January, of joining the front ranks of the developed countries by the end of the century. Presumably this goal has not been abandoned, but the RED FLAG article makes it clear that ideological backsliding will not be permitted in modernizing science and technology. In an apparent attempt to help local officials avoid serious ideological mistakes in educational work, at a time when they are being pressed to produce better-qualified graduates, the article defined "quality" education, spelled out the line to be followed on selecting college students, stressed the need for "red and expert" graduates, and underscored the basic need for working class leadership in all areas of educational work.

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"QUALITY" EDUCATION In a passage which may hold the key to explaining much of Peking's new attack on educational leaders for negating cultural revolutionary educational reforms, the RED FLAG article charged that some cadres had misused the "people's earnest desire to boost China's scientific culture" to reinstate the discredited policy of "giving first place to intellectual education." The article set forth the line that "it is necessary to take into consideration the quality of education," but that "the fallacy of putting intellectual training first" must not be allowed. Asserting that different classes hold different views on what constitutes quality in education, the article stressed that "when we speak of quality, we must first of all emphasize orientation and line" and take into consideration "all-round moral, intellectual and physical training." Pointing to a previously published Mao instruction to make the point that students should be educated "morally, intellectually and physically," the article charged that Mao's educational line has been distorted by some cadres who "fix their attention on 'culture' alone" and "retain only intellectual education while discarding the other two aspects."

STUDENT SELECTION Defending the cultural revolutionary educational reform of selecting college students from the ranks of workers, peasants and soldiers who possess practical experience, the article revealed that some cadres in educational work "deliberately play an opposite tune on this issue." Errant cadres apparently have tried to give preferential treatment to students selected for scientific study by arguing that "for the department of sciences, the students must be selected from among the 'good students' in the middle schools and they should be sent to universities 'directly.'" The article lashed out at the discredited practice of allowing middle school graduates to enter college directly, without a lengthy period of productive labor, as aimed at "restoring the revisionist educational line" and bringing back "the bourgeois educational system of training elite intellectuals." If this "restoration" is allowed to proceed, the article warned, Mao's line on education "will be altered and rejected gradually, and the policy of sending youths to the countryside to take the road of integrating themselves with workers and peasants will be condemned and negated." The article characterized the principle of sending middle school graduates to the countryside for a stint at manual labor as an "important accomplishment" of the cultural revolution which "will not be altered by anyone."

"RED AND EXPERT" While criticizing the practice of paying too much attention to intellectual training, the article stressed that graduates must possess suitable skills pegged to actual production needs, as well as proper ideological credentials at

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graduation time. It criticized those who "sling mud" at the principle of combining political study with traditional academic subjects and distort the "red and expert" ideal as something which "ignores cultural study and which only pays attention to 'practice, practice, practice,'" an allegation the article characterized as "groundless." The article asserted that students must "study cultural and scientific knowledge diligently" and endeavor "to seek refinement in their studies in order to have a good grasp of real skills for serving the people." It argued that "while there are many courses that have to be studied, students must above all study the main course--class struggle" and it called for reforming inane curricula and teaching methods" in order to allow students to "learn useful knowledge from books and at the same time have a good grasp of rich practical knowledge." Those who "slander" the call for "red and expert" graduates are reflecting their "desire to follow the old bourgeois road of carrying out education behind closed doors and to train students as successors of the bourgeoisie."

WORKING CLASS LEADERSHIP The article reiterated Peking's support for the worker propaganda teams, which entered all schools during the cultural revolution, to stay in the schools on a "long-term basis" and to exercise leadership over all aspects of educational work. Opposition to the teams, which has been endemic ever since they entered the academic structure in 1968, appears to be on the upswing again as the article revealed that some cadres hold the mistaken view that only laymen "dedicated to science" should exercise leadership in the schools, an idea aimed at "adulterating Chairman Mao's instruction" that the working class lead in educational reform work. Opponents of the teams apparently "openly promote such trash as 'laymen cannot lead professionals,'" the article charged, and they support the erroneous principle that only "laymen dedicated to science" should lead in the schools as a means to allow those who are "enthusiastically engaged in bourgeois politics to dominate the educational field." "Some people," the article warned, "have really gone too far" in trying to undercut the role of the teams in the schools.

PROVINCIAL REACTION Initial Chinese provincial radio treatment of the campaign has consisted of general reports warning of vigilance against attempts "by a handful of class enemies" to "sabotage" the educational revolution, with only Kiangsi's radio indicating any actual change in specific educational practices. A 7 December Nanchang broadcast of an article by the revolutionary committee of the general school of the Kiangsi Communist Labor University, a model institution for advanced technical training of workers, revealed that "no previous educational background is required

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of students for enrollment." Political quality and practical experience in labor are now the "primary requirements" for new university applicants, who are to be recommended by communes and production brigades "without entrance examinations." Workers and peasants must "receive preference for admission to the school."

Nationwide standards for admission to workers colleges differ from those of regular institutes of higher education, but Kiangsi's elimination of any prior educational training for its students, as well as its open declaration that no examination system will be used to help select new students, reflect a new stress on political criteria for admission and appear to be a response to the latest shift on educational policy. Recent PRC media reports have not shed any light on the current status of the requirement that students selected for training in the regular universities must have an educational background of junior middle school graduates, a stipulation followed for the past several years.

BACKGROUND The new campaign defending educational reforms introduced in the cultural revolution appears to be a reaction to what are now judged overzealous steps taken during the past few months to construct a double-tracked higher educational system that served to insulate workers from regular students.* Last July, for example, several provincial radios revealed that a new system of preferential job assignments for students engaged in scientific study had been adopted, apparently to encourage qualified students to undertake training in technically demanding fields. An 11 July Hunan broadcast indicated that the cultural revolution dictum that students should return to their original production units to engage in labor after graduation had been modified to permit fuller utilization of skills learned in the classroom. All graduates of agricultural colleges in Hunan were scheduled to return to their local communes after graduation, but graduates of colleges of medicine, education and forestry would practice "in part" the principle of "coming from and going back to the communes."

* For a discussion see the TRENDS of 16 July 1975, page 21, of 23 July 1975, page 19 and of 30 July 1975, pages 23-24.

U S S R

HUGE 1975 GRAIN SHORTFALL HINTED AT SUPREME SOVIET SESSION

Statements by officials at the 2-3 December USSR Supreme Soviet session provide the first Soviet indications of the scale of the 1975 grain shortfall. Although reports by Gosplan Chairman Baybakov and Finance Minister Garbuzov included no figures on the 1975 or 1971-75 grain harvests, Ukrainian First Deputy Premier Vashchenko, chairman of the Council of the Union's planning and budget commission, said that during the current five-year plan the average annual grain harvest was eight percent higher than the yearly average for the 1966-70 period. This works out to about 137.5 million tons for 1975, far below last year's 195.6 million and the lowest harvest since the 121.1 million tons in 1965.

Huge shortfalls were also suggested by the speeches of representatives of various republics reported in the 4 and 5 December IZVESTIYA. But the only absolute figure was that provided by Kiev First Secretary Botvin when he said that grain production in the Ukraine during the five-year plan had averaged 40 million tons a year--the same figure used by Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy at the 30 September Ukrainian Central Committee plenum. This figure indicates a 1975 grain harvest of about 34 million--only slightly more than 1972's disastrous 32.6 million tons.

Representatives of the other main grain-growing republics--Kazakhstan and the RSFSR--avoided any mention of the 1975 grain harvest. Kazakh Premier Ashimov spoke of grain production for the period 1971-1974, claiming it had exceeded the planned goals, but said nothing about the 1975 crop. However, Kazakh Agriculture Minister Motoriko had stated in the 12 October KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA that the republic would harvest 4.5 million tons of grain more in this five-year period than in the last one. This would come out to only 11.5 million tons for 1975, the lowest since 1965's 7.6 million. By way of comparison, Kazakhstan had harvested 21 million tons in 1971, 29 million in 1972, 27.6 million in 1973, and 18.5 million in 1974.

RSFSR First Deputy Premier Vorotnikov declared at the session that his republic's average annual "gross agricultural produce" was 12 percent higher in the current five-year period than in the preceeding one--but this gives no basis for judging the grain crop since it refers to the ruble value of all agricultural products. However, some simple calculations show that the RSFSR must be having its worst harvest since 1965. Since the total USSR grain harvest for 1975 was only 137.5 million tons, of which 34 million was provided by the Ukraine and 11.5 million by Kazakhstan, then allowing for several million tons

from Belorussia and the remaining republics, this means that the RSFSR's share was well under the low figures for 1972 and 1967, 91 million and 89 million tons, respectively. The previous low was 69 million in 1965.

Belorussian Premier Kiselev failed to give any figure at the session, simply stating that Belorussia had had a bad year. However, judging by Belorussian First Secretary Masherov's statement in a 24 November speech, Belorussia did relatively well, higher than any year in the past decade except 1971, 1973, and 1974. Masherov gave a figure of 27.4 million for the current five-year period, which would indicate about 4.9 million for 1975, i.e., considerably more than 1972's 4.59 million, even if far below 1974's 6.8 million.

The only republic representatives at the session who claimed to have fulfilled the five-year plan's grain targets were from the two smallest republics, Estonia and Armenia--and they only claimed to have fulfilled the goals for grain procurement, not necessarily the goals for the total grain harvest.

KOMMUNIST ARTICLE ATTACKS KOSYGIN'S 1965 ECONOMIC REFORM

In an unusually direct high-level attack on policies identified with Kosygin, an article in the November KOMMUNIST coauthored by a longtime Brezhnev associate declared that key elements of the September 1965 economic reform have failed in practice. Written by N.F. Lobachev, deputy head of the Central Committee's planning and financial organs section,* and V. Yefimov, the article follows last September's striking snub to Kosygin when the economic reform's tenth anniversary was largely passed over in silence. Although the operation of the reform had been occasionally criticized in past years, this major reform has been increasingly ignored in 1975, and official disfavor has been clearly indicated with the belated publication this summer of Brezhnev's criticisms of the reform in a December 1972 CPSU plenum speech.**

* Lobachev has long ties with Brezhnev. He was minister of state control in Moldavia when Brezhnev was republic first secretary under Stalin, and he was first identified as deputy head of the Central Committee's planning and financial organs section in 1967, after Brezhnev had become CPSU general secretary.

** See the Special Report "Soviet Conflicts Over Economic Priorities Since 1972; New Evidence From Brezhnev's Collected Speeches," No. 311, 31 October 1975.

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The KOMMUNIST article declared that the main planning criteria for industrial enterprises established by the 1965 reform--the figures for profit and total sales--have not worked in practice and must be replaced by a new main criterion--fulfillment of delivery contracts with consumer enterprises. Like Brezhnev in his December 1972 CPSU plenum speech, the authors argued that plant officials manipulate production to the detriment of state interests to achieve higher profits and sales. They also argued that the extension of the economic reform to construction at the end of the 1960's had failed to encourage construction organizations to speed completion of projects. They noted that the number of uncompleted construction projects is actually still growing and the amount of funds tied up as a result has now reached 72 billion rubles.

For construction, they advocated adopting the system introduced in the Belorussian Industrial Construction Ministry, where an organization only gets paid upon completion of its project and where construction organizations must operate on bank credit with interest charges rather than on money from the state budget.* The growth of uncompleted construction was also sharply attacked by Brezhnev in December 1972.

Lobachev and Yefimov had argued for a similar change of criteria in a February 1974 ECONOMIC GAZETTE article, but in that article treated the 1965 economic reform as a success and credited it with initiating the system of direct longterm ties between enterprises on which their proposed contract system is based.

DEFENSE OF REFORM Counter to the critical trend, the November QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS carries an article defending the economic reform; but this article was written by liberal economist A.M. Rumyantsev, who has just lost his last position of authority, membership in the Academy of Sciences presidium.** In contrast to Lobachev, Rumyantsev argued at length that the September 1965 reform had brought great successes and "dynamic" growth, and, instead of urging abandonment of the 1965 reform's criteria, he urged requiring fulfillment of contract delivery obligations in addition to fulfillment of sales indicators.

* For details of the Belorussian system, see the TRENDS of 27 August 1975, pages 22-24.

** See the TRENDS Supplement of 5 December 1975, "Suslov Supervises Election of New Academy of Sciences Leadership."

The reform otherwise had been rarely mentioned this year and the last substantial defense of it was in a January 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY editorial review of the recently published collection of Kosygin speeches. This editorial cited Kosygin's defense of the reform in his speeches and stressed that Kosygin's September 1965 plenum statements had not lost their significance and that the reform had had a positive effect, most of its shortcomings resulting from failure to fully implement it.

The August CALENDAR OF SIGNIFICANT AND MEMORABLE DATES, signed to press 27 June, devoted three pages to the 27 September anniversary of the economic reform, extolling it as an "important landmark" and stressing its continuation. But there was apparently a subsequent decision to downgrade the reform. When the anniversary arrived, it was almost totally ignored in the press--clearly reflecting a Politburo decision to ban reference to it.* The only articles on the anniversary appeared in Central Asia--one by Turkmen Central Committee Secretary B. Geldyyev in a Turkmen-language journal announced in the 26 September TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, and one by Tadzhik Gosplan official K. Akhmedov in the 30 September KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA. The latter article treated the reform as an unqualified success; however it failed to mention Kosygin at all, while twice quoting Brezhnev's September 1965 plenum speech, as if he were author of the reform.

* For elaboration of press treatment of the anniversary, see the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, pages 24-25.

NOTES

DPRK IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN: Pyongyang has launched a new mass drive for "winning the red flag of the three revolutions" which appears aimed at mobilizing the North Korean population in preparation for the next long-range economic plan designed to replace the six-year plan which ended in September. The campaign was kicked-off on 1 December at the model Komdok mine and has drawn extensive comment in recent DPRK media. A 3 December Pyongyang mass rally, reported by KCNA on the 4th, indicated that the new campaign was initiated by the Central Committee of the party in accordance with "the policy of the three revolutions, ideological, technical and cultural," which was introduced by Kim several years ago, and that it would "finally liquidate the survivals of the old society in all spheres of economy and culture, ideology and morality." The campaign may have been discussed at the latest KWP plenum, held 19-21 November, as a means to help achieve economic goals. A 21 November Pyongyang radio report indicated that the plenum had concentrated on economic affairs and that it emphasized the need for making "full-scale preparations for new, grand construction."

PRAVDA CORRECTION: In an extremely rare admission of error, PRAVDA on 7 December carried a "correction" indicating that the previous day's long and authoritative editorial on the December CPSU plenum and Supreme Soviet session had mistakenly stated that the gross national income for 1976 would reach 362 billion rubles. PRAVDA did not supply the correct figure, nor explain how the error had occurred. It seems apparent, however, that it resulted from confusing the 1975 figure with the 1976 figure. Gosplan chairman Baybakov in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 3 December had given the 362 billion figure as the total for 1975. Even so, this error is curious, since this editorial was no doubt prepared with the assistance of the Central Committee headquarters staff. The effect of the mistake and the subsequent "correction" is to draw attention to the fact that the growth of national income during the 1971-1975 five-year plan was under 25 percent rather than the 37-40 percent called for by the plan or the 41 percent actually achieved during the preceding 1966-1970 five-year plan.

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1 - 7 DECEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2568 items)</u>			<u>Peking (852 items)</u>		
Supreme Soviet Session	(--)	11%	President Ford in PRC	(--)	10%*
China	(4%)	6%	Laos People's Democratic	(--)	10%
Laos People's Democratic	(--)	3%	Republic Established		
Republic Established			[PRC Leaders']	(--)	4%
Finnish National Day	(--)	3%	Greetings		
World Peace Council	(15%)	3%	UNGA 30th Session	(14%)	7%
Conference, Leningrad			Albanian Liberation 31st	(5%)	3%
			Anniversary		
			USSR	(2%)	3%
			Japan, Northern	(--)	3%
			Territories		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on President Ford's activities in China including his meeting with Mao Tse-tung.